Terrorism Primer 

 

Table of Contents 

 

 

1. ANTI-TERRORIST STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

1. Terrorism – General Principles

 

 

 

Terrorist attacks are conducted much like unconventional warfare operations and have similar phases.  There is the target selection, reconnaissance and preparation, training, transportation and final execution phases. Anything done to disrupt any of these phases will deter, delay or foil a terrorist attack.  Bombing is the most common form of attack against facilities with remotely detonated or timed bombs constituting the primary tactic.  Most but not all terrorist groups plan for a successful escape and extraction from the target area, but the most fanatical terrorist groups do not consider survival a consideration.   The most vulnerable targets are those with a set routine and little if any physical security.    As a general rule, good physical security, acute awareness of a person or command’s surroundings and a varying routine of behavior and security will both increase the probability of countering a terrorist attack and deter all but the most fanatical terrorists from attacking in the first place.  The lower the risk to the terrorist, the higher the probability of attack.

2. Anti-Terrorism

 

 

 

Anti -Terrorism is defined as "defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces." 

 

Security is the most obvious requirement in combating terrorism. Terrorists rely on surprise and the victim's confusion at the time of an incident. Antiterrorism involves physical security, operational security (OPSEC), and the practice of personal protective measures by all personnel. Commanders and staffs must plan their response to terrorist threats and incidents. Combating terrorism is an aspect of force protection and is the responsibility of commanders at all echelons at all times.  

 

In combating terrorism, intelligence is extraordinarily important. The essential elements of information (EEI) differ somewhat from those normally found in traditional combat situations. In addition to the terrorists' strength, skills, equipment, logistic capabilities, leader profiles, source of supply, and tactics, more specific information is needed. This includes the groups' goals, affiliations, indication of their willingness to kill or die for their cause, and significant events in their history, such as the death of martyrs or some symbolic event. The specific EEI are particularly important because most terrorist groups are interested in symbolically significant targets rather than in targets that would be operationally more damaging to US forces. 

 

Source: http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/bpart4.html 

 

The following sections detail specific anti-terrorism strategies and tactics:

 

 

3. Physical Facilities Protection

 

PHYSICAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 

FACILITY AND BUILDING LOCATION

 

Start by determining the sensitivity of the facility, whether it is open to the public and the time it will take for enforcement response to incidents.

 

Check geographical factors carefully. Avoid locating facilities near high crime, high traffic or industrial areas. Take into account approach routes, traffic patterns, and nearby transportation.

 

At a facility site, the number of separate buildings should be kept to a minimum, and they should be grouped close together.

 

CONFIGURATION OF SPACE

 

Entrances

 

Facility or office entrances should be kept to a minimum commensurate with fire safety, to control access or prevent crime. Although convenience of employee access, parking, and deliveries must be considered, one entrance with multiple interior routes is preferable to several outside entrances. Entrances should be planned with guard posts and access control systems and procedures in mind. Reception desks, barriers and other controls should be planned from the start.

 

Access Controls

 

Plan for locking devices or controls at perimeter and interior doors. Provide for effective key control. Plan for protective, cleaning, and maintenance forces and determine hours, locations, and levels of access for such personnel.

 

Location of Offices and Facilities

 

Locate offices or other facilities in close proximity and on the same or successive floors. Try to locate sensitive operations on upper floors and away from entrances.

 

Safety and Fire Protection

 

Safety and fire protection requirements must be incorporated in any construction plans. With proper coordination both safety and security requirements can be achieved. If applicable, contact the Regional Safety Manager regarding National Fire Prevention Administration (NFPA) and local code requirements and construction standards.

 

Utilities

 

Utility systems should be protected against unauthorized access. Plan for protection of telephone and electrical closets and conduit runs, heating and cooling systems, water supplies, boilers and generators, and valves, regulators and controls.

 

Special Activities

 

Special emphasis should be placed on security systems and safeguards when constructing or modifying special or sensitive activities such as imprest funds, computer facilities, equipment storage or shipping and receiving areas, classified work areas and mail rooms, and special use areas such as warehouses or hazardous materials storage areas.

 

Contingency Plans

 

A contingency plan must be developed for each facility to protect personnel and property in the event of emergencies such as fire, bomb threats, civil disturbances and natural disasters.  Designated an official to be responsible for developing, implementing and maintaining an Occupant Emergency Plan.  

 

Surveys and Inspections

 

A physical security survey is an in-depth analysis to determine the extent of security measures which will be needed for protecting personnel, property, and information. An inspection is a check or test against a certain set of standards or regulations to ascertain whether a security program or facility meets those standards or regulations.  It is used to evaluate the implementation of regulations, the security awareness of employees, security administration, and existing internal management controls.  It should be used as a tool by the security officer to carry out his/her oversight responsibilities.

 

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

 

 

 

EXTERNAL PROTECTION

 

Perimeter Security Measures

 

Perimeter protection is the first line of defense in providing physical security for a facility. This can be accomplished by installing fences or other physical barriers, outside lighting, lockable gates, intrusion detectors, or a guard force. Perimeter protection also includes walls, lockable doors and windows, bars and grills, and fire escapes.

 

In addition to defining the physical limits of a facility and controlling access, a perimeter barrier also creates a physical and psychological deterrent to unauthorized entry. It delays intrusion into an area, making the possibility of detection and apprehension more likely. It aids security forces in controlling access and assists in directing the flow of persons and vehicles through designated entrances.

 

Every vulnerable point should be protected to deter or prevent unauthorized access to the facility.  The roof, basement, and walls of a building may contain vulnerable points of potential entry.  A security survey of the perimeter should address manholes and tunnels, gates leading to the basement, elevator shafts, ventilation openings, skylights, and any opening 96 square inches or larger which is within 18 feet of the ground.

 

The extent of perimeter controls will be determined by the senior facility manager, based upon a comprehensive security survey. The survey report should recommend perimeter controls to the facility manager.

 

Physical Barriers

 

Physical barriers may be of two general types--natural and structural. Natural barriers include mountains, cliffs, canyons, rivers, or other terrain difficult to traverse. Structural barriers are man-made devices such as fences, walls, floors, roofs, grills, bars, or other structures which deter penetration. If a natural barrier forms one side or any part of the perimeter, it in itself should not automatically be considered an adequate perimeter barrier, since it may be overcome by a determined intruder. Structural barriers should be provided for that portion of the perimeter, if required.

 

Fencing

 

Fences are the most common perimeter barrier or control. Two types normally used are chain link and barbed wire. The choice is dependent primarily upon the degree of permanence of the facility and local ordinances. A perimeter fence should be continuous, be kept free of plant growth, and be maintained in good condition.

 

Chain Link

 

Chain link fencing should be laid out in straight lines to permit unhampered observation. It should be constructed of number 11 gauge or heavier wire mesh (two inch square) and should be not less than seven feet high and have a top guard. It should extend to within two inches of firm ground. It should be taunt and securely fastened to rigid metal posts set in concrete. Anti-erosion measures like surface priming may be necessary. Where the fence traverses culverts, troughs, or other openings larger than 96 square inches in area, the openings should be protected by fencing, iron grills, or other barriers to prevent passage of intruders without impending drainage. Chain link fencing is low in maintenance cost, a minimal safety hazard, and has openings small enough to discourage the passage of pilfered articles.

 

Barbed Wire

 

Standard barbed wire is twisted, double strand, number 12 gauge wire, with four-point barbs spaced four inches apart. Barbed wire fencing, including gates intended to prevent trespassing, should be no less than seven feet in height plus a top guard, tightly stretched, and should be firmly affixed to posts not more than six feet apart. Distances between strands should not exceed six inches.

 

Top Guard

 

A top guard is an overhang of barbed wire along the top of a fence, facing outward and upward at an angle of 45 degrees. Three or four strands of barbed wire spaced six inches apart are used, but the length of the supporting arms and the number of strands can be increased when required. The supporting arms should be affixed to the top of the fence posts and be of sufficient height to increase the overall height of the fence at least one foot. Where a building of less than three stories is used to form a part of the perimeter, a top guard should be used along the outside wall to deter access to the roof.

 

Gates

 

The purpose of a gate is to provide a break in a perimeter fence or wall to allow entry. Gates are protected by locks, intermittent guard patrols, fixed guard posts, contact alarms, CCTV or a combination of these. The number of gates and perimeter entrances should be limited to those absolutely necessary, but should be sufficient to accommodate the peak flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.

 

Gates should be adequately lighted. They should be locked when not manned and periodically inspected by a roving guard force. Utility openings in a fence that do not serve as gates should be locked, guarded, or otherwise protected.

 

Intrusion detection devices may be desirable when the gate is used intermittently or when a higher level of protection is desired. Alternatives to detection devices include coded card keys, push button combination locks, and CCTV.

 

Protective Lighting

 

Protective lighting is a valuable and inexpensive deterrent to crime. It improves visibility for checking badges and people at entrances, inspecting vehicles, preventing illegal entry, and detecting intruders both outside and inside buildings and grounds. Locate protective lighting where it will illuminate shadowed areas and be directed at probable routes of intrusion. Also, overlap lighting to prevent dark areas. If justified, include emergency power for lighting.

 

Doors

 

A door is a vulnerable point of the security of any building. A door should be installed so the hinges are on the inside to preclude removal of the screws or the use of chisels or cutting devices. Pins in exterior hinges should be welded, flanged, or otherwise secured, or hinge dowels should be used to preclude the door's removal. The door should be metal or solid wood. Remember that locks, doors, doorframes, and accessory builder's hardware are inseparable when evaluating barrier value. Do not put a sturdy lock on a weak door. The best door is of little value if there are exposed removable hinge pins, breakable vision panels, or other weaknesses that would allow entry. Transoms should be sealed permanently or locked from the inside with a sturdy sliding bolt lock or other similar device or equipped with bars or grills.

 

Overhead roll doors not controlled or locked by electric power should be protected by slide bolts on the bottom bar. Chain link doors should be provided with an iron keeper and pin for securing the hand chain, and the shaft on a crank operated door should be secured. A solid overhead, swinging, sliding, or accordion type garage door should be secured with a cylinder lock or padlock. Also, a metal slide bar, bolt, or crossbar should be provided on the inside. Metal accordion grate or grill-type doors should have a secured metal guide track at the top and bottom and be secured with a cylinder lock or padlock.

 

Windows

 

Windows are another vulnerable point for gaining illegal access to a building. Windows should be secured on the inside using a lock, locking bolt, slide bar, or crossbar with a padlock. The window frame must be securely fastened to the building so that it cannot be pried loose. As with glass panels in a door, window glass can be broken or cut so the intruder can reach inside and release the lock.

 

Bars and steel grills can be used to protect a window. They should be at least one half inch in diameter, round, and spaced apart six inches on center. If a grill is used, the material should be number nine gauge two-inch square mesh. Outside hinges on window should have non-removable pins. The hinge pins should be welded, flanged, or otherwise secured so they cannot be removed. Bars and grills must be securely fastened to the window frame so they cannot be pried loose.

 

Manholes, Grates, and Storm Drains

 

Many facilities have manholes and tunnels providing service entrance into buildings. Other manholes may provide entrance to tunnels containing pipes for heat, gas, water, and telephone. If a tunnel penetrates the interior of a building, the manhole cover should be secured. A chain or padlock can be used to secure a manhole. Steel grates and doors flush with the ground level may provide convenient access. These openings may be designed into the facility as they may provide light and ventilation to the basement levels. If the frame is properly secured, the grates or doors can be welded into place or they can be secured with a chain and padlock. Sewers or storm drains which might provide an entrance should be secured.

 

Roof Openings

 

Openings in elevators, penthouses, hatchways, or doors to the roof are often overlooked because of infrequent use. Skylights are another source of entry from the roof. These openings can be protected like windows--with bars or mesh. Such protection should be installed inside the openings to make it more difficult to remove.

 

Shafts, Vents, and Ducts

 

Ventilation shafts, vents, or ducts, and openings in the building to accommodate ventilating fans or the air conditioning system can be used to enter a facility. A ventilation fan can be removed or the blade bent to make a sufficiently large opening for entry. Bars are recommended to deter such access. Screens are generally considered less desirable than bars because screens may interfere with airflow.

 

Fire Escapes and Building Walls

 

Normally, outside fire escapes do not provide an entrance directly into the building. However, they can provide easy access to the roof or openings high above the ground level. Windows or other openings off the fire escape should be capable of being opened only from the inside. The exterior fire escape should not extend all the way to the ground.

 

Walls are not normally considered possible points of entry because of their usual solid construction. However, they cannot be disregarded because intruders may be able to break through them to gain entrance. Reinforcement at critical points may be necessary to deter forced entry.

 

Facilities in Remote Locations

 

Large facilities located in sparsely inhabited areas have an inherent form of protection by virtue of their isolation. Constructing a fence around the perimeter usually will provide an adequate deterrent to entry. Occasional observation by a roving guard force may be necessary depending on the sensitivity of the facility. Warning signs or notices should be posed to deter trespassing on government property. CCTV systems also can be especially helpful if guard forces are available to monitor them.

 

INTERIOR PROTECTION

 

Interior Security Controls

 

After exterior perimeter controls, the second line of defense is interior controls. When an intruder is able to penetrate the perimeter controls and the building exterior, the effectiveness of interior controls is tested. There are few facilities where every employee has access to every area in the facility. Accordingly, access to some areas is necessarily controlled. For example, interior controls are necessary to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure, to prevent damage to the area or equipment, to prevent interference with operations, for safety purposes, or for a combination of these and other reasons.

 

Usually, interior controls are applied to specific rooms or physical spaces within a building. The senior facility or office manager is responsible for determining whether interior controls are necessary. Office area controls include key accountability systems, locking devices, and access control systems such as sign in registers and identifying credentials.

 

Determine the extent of interior controls by considering the monetary value and mission criticality of the items or areas to be protected, the vulnerability of the facility, and the cost of the controls. Normally, the cost of security controls should not exceed the value of the item or areas to be protected.

 

Area Designations

 

The decision to designate areas as either a "Controlled Area" or a "Restricted Area" should be made in conjunction with a decision to close the property or a portion thereof to the public.

 

Controlled Area

 

A controlled area is defined as a room, office, building or other form of facility to which access is monitored, limited, or controlled. Admittance to a controlled area is limited to persons who have official business within the area. Responsible managers are authorized to designate an area as a controlled area after adequate security measures are in place. The following areas should be designated as controlled areas:

 

An area where classified information or highly sensitive information is handled, processed, or stored. A mailroom is considered such an area.

 

An area that houses equipment that is significantly valuable or critical to the continued operations or provision of services.

 

An area where uncontrolled access would interfere with or disrupt personnel assigned to the area in carrying out their official duties.

 

An area where equipment or operations constitute a potential safety hazard.

 

An area that is particularly sensitive as determined by the responsible manager.

 

Source: http://www.usgs.gov/usgs-manual/handbook/hb/440-2-h.html#chapter3_2

4. Bomb Security Measures

 

Bombing and the threat of being bombed are harsh realities in today's world. The public is becoming more aware of those incidents of violence that are perpetrated by vicious, nefarious segments of our society through the illegal use of explosives. Law enforcement agencies are charged with providing protection for life and property, but law enforcement alone cannot be held responsible. Every citizen must do his or her part to ensure a safe environment.

 

This section is designed to help both the public and private sectors prepare for the potential threat of explosives related violence. While the ideas set forth herein are applicable in most cases, they are intended only as a guide. The information provided is compiled from a wide range of sources, including the actual experiences of special agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).

 

If there is one point that cannot be overemphasized, it is the value of being prepared. Do not allow a bomb incident to catch you by surprise. By developing a bomb incident plan and considering possible bomb incidents in your physical security plan, you can reduce the potential for personal injury and property damage.

 

BOMBS

 

Bombs can be constructed to look like almost anything and can be placed or delivered in any number of ways. The probability of finding a bomb that looks like the stereotypical bomb is almost nonexistent. The only common denominator that exists among bombs is that they are designed or intended to explode.

 

Most bombs are homemade and are limited in their design only by the imagination of, and resources available to, the bomber. Remember, when searching for a bomb, suspect anything that looks unusual. Let the trained bomb technician determine what is or is not a bomb.

 

Bomb Threats

 

Bomb threats are delivered in a variety of ways. The majority of threats are called in to the target. Occasionally these calls are through a third party. Sometimes a threat is communicated in writing or by a recording. Two logical explanations for reporting a bomb threat are:

 

1. The caller has definite knowledge or believes that an explosive or incendiary bomb has been or will be placed and he/she wants to minimize personal injury or property damage. The caller may be the person who placed the device or someone who has become aware of such information.

 

2. The caller wants to create an atmosphere of anxiety and panic which will, in turn, result in a disruption of the normal activities at the facility where the device is purportedly placed. Whatever the reason for the report, there will certainly be a reaction to it. Through proper planning, the wide variety of potentially uncontrollable reactions can be greatly reduced.

 

Why Prepare?

 

If you accept the two aforementioned explanations for reporting that a bomb is about to go off, you can better prepare to foil the bomber or threat maker. Through proper preparation, you can reduce the accessibility of your business or building and identify those areas that can be "hardened" against the potential bomber. This will limit the amount of time lost to searching, if you determine a search is necessary. If a bomb incident occurs, proper planning will instill confidence in the leadership, reinforce the notion that those in charge do care, and reduce the potential for personal injury and property loss. Proper planning can also reduce the threat of panic, the most contagious of all human emotions. Panic is sudden, excessive, unreasoning, infectious terror. Once a state of panic has been reached, the potential for injury and property damage is greatly increased. In the context of a bomb threat, panic is the ultimate achievement of the caller not taking every step necessary to meet the threat.

 

How to Prepare

 

In preparing to cope with a bomb incident, it is necessary to develop two separate but interdependent plans, namely a physical security plan and a bomb incident plan. Physical security provides for the protection of property, personnel, facilities, and material against unauthorized entry, trespass, damage, sabotage, or other illegal or criminal acts. The physical security plan deals with prevention and control of access to the building. In most instances, some form of physical security may be already in existence, although not necessarily intended to prevent a bomb attack.

 

The bomb incident plan provides detailed procedures to be implemented when a bombing attack is executed or threatened. In planning for the bomb incident, a definite chain of command or line of authority must be established. Only by using an established organization and procedures can the bomb incident be handled with the least risk to all concerned. A clearly defined line of authority will instill confidence and avoid panic.

 

Establishing a chain of command is easy if there is a simple office structure, one business, one building. However, if a complex situation exists, a multi-occupant building for example, a representative from each occupant entity should attend the planning conference. A leader should be appointed and a clear line of succession delineated. This chain of command should be printed and circulated to all concerned parties.

 

In planning, you should designate a command center to be located in the switchboard room or other focal point of telephone or radio communications. The management personnel assigned to operate the center should have the authority to decide whatever action should be taken during the threat. Only those with assigned duties should be permitted in the center. Make some provision for alternates in the event someone is absent when a threat is received. Obtain an updated blueprint or floor plan of your building and maintain it in the command center.

 

Contact the police department, fire department, or local government agencies to determine if any assistance is available to you for developing your physical security plan or bomb incident plan. If possible, have police and/or fire department representatives and members of your staff inspect the building for areas where explosives are likely to be concealed. (Make a checklist of these areas for inclusion in command center materials.) Determine whether there is a bomb disposal unit available, how to contact the unit, and under what conditions it is activated. In developing your bomb incident plan, you must also ascertain whether the bomb disposal unit, in addition to disarming and removing the explosives, will assist in searching the building in the event of a threat.

 

Training is essential to deal properly with a bomb threat incident. Instruct all personnel, especially those at the telephone switchboard, in what to do if a bomb threat is received. Be absolutely certain that all personnel assigned to the command center are aware of their duties. The positive aspects of planning will be lost if the leadership is not apparent. It is also very important to organize and train an evacuation unit which will be responsive to the command center and has a clear understanding of the importance of its role.

 

We have suggested that the command center be located near the switchboard or focal point of communications. It is critical that lines of communication be established between the command center and the search or evacuation teams. The center must have the flexibility to keep up with the search team progress. In a large facility, if the teams go beyond the communications network, the command center must have the mobility to maintain contact and track search or evacuation efforts.

 

Security Against Bomb Incidents

 

We mentioned earlier that, in dealing with bomb incidents or potential bomb incidents, two interrelated plans must be developed, the bomb incident plan and the physical security plan. Heretofore, we have primarily addressed the bomb incident plan. Now, before continuing with that plan, we will discuss security measures as they apply to "hardening" against the bomb attack.

 

Most commercial structures and individual residences already have some security in place, planned or unplanned, realized or not. Locks on windows and doors, outside lights, etc., are all designed and installed to contribute toward the security of a facility and the protection of its occupants.

 

In considering measures to increase security for your building or office, it is highly recommended that you contact your local police department for guidance regarding a specific plan for your facility. There is no single security plan that is adaptable to all situations. The following recommendations are offered because they may contribute to reducing your vulnerability to bomb attacks.

 

The exterior configuration of a building or facility is very important. Unfortunately, in most instances, the architect has given little or no consideration to security, particularly toward thwarting or discouraging a bomb attack. However, by the addition of fencing and lighting, and by controlling access, the vulnerability of a facility to a bomb attack can be reduced significantly.

 

Bombs being delivered by car or left in a car are a grave reality. Parking should be restricted, if possible, to 300 feet from your building or any building in a complex. If restricted parking is not feasible, properly identified employee vehicles should be parked closest to your facility and visitor vehicles parked at a distance.

 

Heavy shrubs and vines should be kept close to the ground to reduce their potential to conceal criminals or bombs. Window boxes and planters are perfect receptacles for the bomber. Unless there is an absolute requirement for such ornamentation, window boxes and planters are better removed. If they must remain, a security patrol should be employed to check them regularly.

 

A highly visible security patrol can be a significant deterrent. Even if this "patrol" is only one security guard/night guard, he/she is optimally utilized outside the building. If an interior guard is utilized, consider the installation of closed circuit television cameras that cover exterior building perimeters. Have an adequate burglar alarm system installed by a reputable company that can service and properly maintain the equipment. Post signs indicating that such a system is in place.

 

Entrance/exit doors with hinges and hinge pins on the inside to prevent removal should be installed. Solid wood or sheet metal faced doors provide extra integrity that a hollow core wooden door cannot provide. A steel doorframe that properly fits the door is as important as the construction of the door. The ideal security situation is a building with no windows. However, bars, grates, heavy mesh screens, or steel shutters over windows offer good protection from otherwise unwanted entry. It is important that the openings in the protective coverings are not too large. Otherwise, a bomb may be introduced into the building while the bomber remains outside. Floor vents, transoms, and skylights should also be covered. Please note that fire safety considerations preclude the use of certain window coverings. Municipal ordinances should be researched and safety considered before any of these renovations are undertaken.

 

Controls should be established for positively identifying personnel who are authorized access to critical areas and for denying access to unauthorized personnel. These controls should extend to the inspection of all packages and materials being taken into critical areas.

 

Security and maintenance personnel should be alert for people who act in a suspicious manner, as well as objects, items, or parcels which look out of place or suspicious. Surveillance should be established to include potential hiding places (e.g., stairwells, rest rooms, and any vacant office space) for unwanted individuals.

 

Doors or access ways to such areas as boiler rooms, mailrooms, computer areas, switchboards, and elevator control rooms should remain locked when not in use. It is important to establish a procedure for the accountability of keys. If keys cannot be accounted for, locks should be changed.

 

Good housekeeping is also vital. Trash or dumpster areas should remain free of debris. A bomb or device can easily be concealed in the trash. Combustible materials should be properly disposed of, or protected if further use is anticipated.

 

Install detection devices at all entrances and closed-circuit television in those areas previously identified as likely places where a bomb may be placed. This, coupled with the posting of signs indicating such measures are in place, is a good deterrent.

 

The ATF recognizes the necessity for businesses to maintain good public relations. Corporate responsibility, however, also encompasses the safety and protection of the public. The threatened use of explosives necessitates that in the interest of safety and security, some inconvenience may have to be imposed on visitors to public buildings. The public is becoming more accustomed to routine security checks and will readily accept these minor inconveniences.

 

Perhaps entrances and exits can be modified with a minimal expenditure to channel all visitors through someone at a reception desk. Individuals entering the building would be required to sign a register indicating the name and room number of the person whom they wish to visit. Employees at these reception desks could contact the person to be visited and advise him/her that a visitor, by name, is in the lobby. The person to be visited may decide to come to the lobby to ascertain that the purpose of the visit is valid. A system for signing out when the individual departs could be integrated into this procedure.

 

Such a procedure may result in complaints from the public. If the reception desk clerk explains to the visitor that these procedures were implemented in his/her best interest and safety, the complaints would be reduced. The placement of a sign at the reception desk informing visitors of the need for safety is another option.

 

Responding to Bomb Threats

 

Instruct all personnel, especially those at the telephone switchboard, in what to do if a bomb threat call is received.

 

It is always desirable that more than one person listen in on the call. To do this, a covert signaling system should be implemented, perhaps by using a coded buzzer signal to a second reception point. A calm response to the bomb threat caller could result in obtaining additional information. This is especially true if the caller wishes to avoid injuries or deaths. If told that the building is occupied or cannot be evacuated in time, the bomber may be willing to give more specific information on the bomb's location, components, or method of initiation.

 

The bomb threat caller is the best source of information about the bomb. When a bomb threat is called in:

 

- Keep the caller on the line as long as possible. Ask him/her to repeat the message. Record every word spoken by the person.

 

- If the caller does not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of possible detonation, ask him/her for this information.

 

- Inform the caller that the building is occupied and the detonation of a bomb could result in death or serious injury to many innocent people.

 

- Pay particular attention to background noises, such as motors running, music playing, and any other noise which may give a clue as to the location of the caller.

 

- Listen closely to the voice (male, female), voice quality (calm, excited), accents, and speech impediments. Immediately after the caller hangs up, report the threat to the person designated by management to receive such information .

 

- Report the information immediately to the police department, fire department, ATF, FBI, and other appropriate agencies. The sequence of notification should be established in the bomb incident plan.

 

- Remain available, as law enforcement personnel will want to interview you.

 

When a written threat is received, save all materials, including any envelope or container. Once the message is recognized as a bomb threat, further unnecessary handling should be avoided. Every possible effort must be made to retain evidence such as fingerprints, handwriting or typewriting, paper, and postal marks. These will prove essential in tracing the threat and identifying the writer.

 

While written messages are usually associated with generalized threats and extortion attempts, a written warning of a specific device may occasionally be received. It should never be ignored.

 

Decision Time

 

The most serious of all decisions to be made by management in the event of a bomb threat is whether to evacuate the building. In many cases, this decision may have already been made during the development of the bomb incident plan. Management may pronounce a carte blanche policy that, in the event of a bomb threat, total evacuation will be effective immediately. This decision circumvents the calculated risk and demonstrates a deep concern for the safety of personnel in the building. However, such a decision can result in costly loss of time.

 

Essentially, there are three alternatives when faced with a bomb threat:

 

1. Ignore the threat.

 

2. Evacuate immediately.

 

3. Search and evacuate if warranted.

 

Ignoring the threat completely can result in some problems. While a statistical argument can be made that very few bomb threats are real, it cannot be overlooked that bombs have been located in connection with threats. If employees learn that bomb threats have been received and ignored, it could result in morale problems and have a long-term adverse effect on your business. Also, there is the possibility that if the bomb threat caller feels that he/she is being ignored, he/she may go beyond the threat and actually plant a bomb.

 

Evacuating immediately on every bomb threat is an alternative that on face value appears to be the preferred approach. However, the negative factors inherent in this approach must be considered. The obvious result of immediate evacuation is the disruptive effect on your business. If the bomb threat caller knows that your policy is to evacuate each time a call is made, he/she can continually call and force your business to a standstill. An employee, knowing that the policy is to evacuate immediately, may make a threat in order to get out of work. A student may use a bomb threat to avoid a class or miss a test. Also, a bomber wishing to cause personal injuries could place a bomb near an exit normally used to evacuate and then call in the threat.

 

Initiating a search after a threat is received and evacuating a building after a suspicious package or device is found is the third, and perhaps most desired, approach. It is certainly not as disruptive as an immediate evacuation and will satisfy the requirement to do something when a threat is received. If a device is found, the evacuation can be accomplished expeditiously while at the same time avoiding the potential danger areas of the bomb.

 

Evacuation

 

An evacuation unit consisting of management personnel should be organized and trained. The organization and training of this unit should be coordinated with the development of the bomb incident plan, as well as with all tenants of a building.

 

The evacuation unit should be trained in how to evacuate the building during a bomb threat. You should consider priority of evacuation, e.g., evacuation by floor level. Evacuate the floor levels above and below the danger area in order to remove those persons from danger as quickly as possible. Training in this type of evacuation is usually available from police, fire or other units within the community. You may also train the evacuation unit in search techniques, or you may prefer a separate search unit. Volunteer personnel should be solicited for this function. Assignment of search wardens, team leaders, etc., can be employed. To be proficient in searching the building, search personnel must be thoroughly familiar with all hallways, rest rooms, false ceiling areas, and every location in the building where an explosive or incendiary device may be concealed. When police officers or firefighters arrive at the building, the contents and the floor plan will be unfamiliar to them if they have not previously reconnoitered the facility. Thus, it is extremely important that the evacuation or search unit be thoroughly trained and familiar with the floor plan of the building and immediate outside areas. When a room or particular area is searched, it should be marked or sealed with a piece of tape and reported to the supervisor of that area.

 

The evacuation or search unit should be trained only in evacuation and search techniques and not in the techniques of neutralizing, removing or otherwise having contact with the device. If a device is located, it should not be disturbed. However, its location should be well marked and a route back to the device noted.

 

Search Teams

 

It is advisable to use more than one individual to search any area or room, no matter how small. Searches can be conducted by supervisory personnel, area occupants or trained explosive search teams. There are advantages and disadvantages to each method of staffing the search teams.

 

Using supervisory personnel to search is a rapid approach and causes little disturbance. There will be little loss of employee working time, but a morale problem may develop if it is discovered that a bomb threat has been received and workers were left unaware. Using a supervisor to search will usually not be as thorough because of his/her unfamiliarity with many areas and his/her desire to get on with business.

 

Using area occupants to search their own areas is the best method for a rapid search. The occupants' concern for their own safety will contribute toward a more thorough search. Furthermore, the personnel conducting the search are familiar with what does or does not belong in a particular area. Using occupants to search will result in a shorter loss of work time than if all were evacuated prior to search by trained teams. Using the occupants to search can have a positive effect on morale, given a good training program to develop confidence. Of course, this would require the training of an entire work force, and ideally the performance of several practical training exercises. One drawback of this search method is the increased danger to unevacuated workers.

 

The search conducted by a trained team is the best for safety, morale and thoroughness, though it does take the most time. Using a trained team will result in a significant loss of production time. It is a slow operation that requires comprehensive training and practice.

 

The decision as to who should conduct searches lies with management, and should be considered and incorporated into the bomb incident plan.

 

Search Technique

 

The following room search technique is based on the use of a two person searching team. There are many minor variations possible in searching a room. The following contains only the basic techniques. When the two person search team enters the room to be searched, they should first move to various parts of the room and stand quietly with their eyes closed and listen for a clockwork device. Frequently, a clockwork mechanism can be quickly detected without use of special equipment. Even if no clockwork mechanism is detected, the team is now aware of the background noise level within the room itself.

 

Background noise or transferred sound is always disturbing during a building search. If a ticking sound is heard but cannot be located, one might become unnerved. The ticking sound may come from an unbalanced air conditioner fan several floors away or from a dripping sink down the hall. Sound will transfer through air-conditioning ducts, along water pipes, and through walls. One of the most difficult buildings to search is one that has steam or hot water heat. This type of building will constantly thump, crack, chatter, and tick due to the movement of the steam or hot water through the pipes and the expansion and contraction of the pipes. Background noise may also include outside traffic sounds, rain, and wind.

 

The individual in charge of the room searching team should look around the room and determine how the room is to be divided for searching and to what height the first searching sweep should extend. The first searching sweep will cover all items resting on the floor up to the selected height.

 

You should divide the room into two virtually equal parts. This equal division should be based on the number and type of objects in the room to be searched and not on the size of the room. An imaginary line is then drawn between two objects in the room; e.g., the edge of the window on the north wall to the floor lamp on the south wall.

 

First Room Searching Sweep

 

Look at the furniture or objects in the room and determine the average height of the majority of items resting on the floor. In an average room, this height usually includes table or desk tops and chair backs. The first searching height usually covers the items in the room up to hip height. After the room has been divided and a searching height has been selected, both individuals go to one end of the room division line and start from a back-to-back position. This is the starting point, and the same point will be used on each successive searching sweep. Each person now starts searching his/her way around the room, working toward the other person, checking all items resting on the floor around the wall area of the room. When the two individuals meet, they will have completed a "wall sweep." They should then work together and check all items in the middle of the room up to the selected hip height, including the floor under the rugs. This first searching sweep should also include those items which may be mounted on or in the walls, such as air-conditioning ducts, baseboard heaters, and built-in wall cupboards, if these fixtures are below hip height.

 

The first searching sweep usually consumes the most time and effort. During all the searching sweeps, use the electronic or medical stethoscope on walls, furniture items, and floors.

 

Second Room Searching Sweep

 

The individual in charge again looks at the furniture or objects in the room and determines the height of the second searching sweep. This height is usually from the hip to the chin or top of the head. The two persons return to the starting point and repeat the searching technique at the second selected searching height. This sweep usually covers pictures hanging on the walls, built-in bookcases, and tall table lamps.

 

Third Room Searching Sweep

 

When the second searching sweep is completed, the person in charge again determines the next searching height, usually from the chin or the top of the head up to the ceiling. The third sweep is then made. This sweep usually covers high mounted air-conditioning ducts and hanging light fixtures.

 

Fourth Room Searching Sweep

 

If the room has a false or suspended ceiling, the fourth sweep involves investigation of this area. Check flush or ceiling mounted light fixtures, air-conditioning or ventilation ducts, sound or speaker systems, electrical wiring, and structural frame members.

 

Have a sign or marker indicating "Search Completed" conspicuously posted in the area. Place a piece of colored Scotch tape across the door and door jamb approximately 2 feet above floor level if the use of signs is not practical.

 

The room searching technique can be expanded. The same basic technique can be applied to search any enclosed area. Encourage the use of common sense or logic in searching. If a guest speaker at a convention has been threatened, common sense would indicate searching the speaker’s platform and microphones first, but always return to the searching technique. Do not rely on random or spot checking of only logical target areas. The bomber may not be a logical person.

 

In conclusion, the following steps should be taken in order to search a room:

 

1. Divide the area and select a search height.

 

2. Start from the bottom and work up.

 

3. Start back-to-back and work toward each other.

 

4. Go around the walls and proceed toward the center of the room.

 

Suspicious Object Located

 

It is imperative that personnel involved in a search be instructed that their only mission is to search for and report suspicious objects. Under no circumstances should anyone move, jar or touch a suspicious object or anything attached to it. The removal or disarming of a bomb must be left to the professionals in explosive ordnance disposal. When a suspicious object is discovered, the following procedures are recommended:

 

1. Report the location and an accurate description of the object to the appropriate warden. This information should be relayed immediately to the command center, which will, notify the police and fire departments, and rescue squad. These officers should be met and escorted to the scene.

 

2. If absolutely necessary, place sandbags or mattresses, never metal shields, around the suspicious object. Do not attempt to cover the object.

 

3. Identify the danger area, and block it off with a clear zone of at least 300 feet, including floors below and above the object.

 

4. Check to see that all doors and windows are open to minimize primary damage from blast and secondary damage from fragmentation.

 

5. Evacuate the building.

 

6. Do not permit reentry into the building until the device has been removed/disarmed, and the reentry.

 

Handling of the News Media

 

It is of paramount importance that all inquiries from the news media be directed to one individual appointed as spokesperson. All other persons should be instructed not to discuss the situation with outsiders, especially the news media.

 

The purpose of this provision is to furnish the news media with accurate information and to see that additional bomb threat calls are not precipitated by irresponsible statements from uninformed sources.

 

Summary

 

This article serves only as a guide and is not intended to be anything more. The ultimate determination of how to handle a bomb threat must be made by the individual responsible for the threatened facility. Develop a bomb incident plan. Draw upon any expertise that is available to you from police departments, government agencies, and security specialists. Don't leave anything to chance. Be prepared!

 

BOMB INCIDENT PLAN

 

1. Designate a chain of command. 
2. Establish a command center. 
3. Decide what primary and alternate communications will be used. 
4. Establish clearly how and by whom a bomb threat will be evaluated. 
5. Decide what procedures will be followed when a bomb threat is received or device discovered. 
6. Determine to what extent the available bomb squad will assist and at what point the squad will respond. 
7. Provide an evacuation plan with enough flexibility to avoid a suspected danger area. 
8. Designate search teams. 
9. Designate areas to be searched. 
10. Establish techniques to be utilized during search. 
11. Establish a procedure to report and track progress of the search and a method to lead qualified bomb technicians to a suspicious package. 
12. Have a contingency plan available if a bomb should go off. 
13. Establish a simple to follow procedure for the person receiving the bomb threat. 
14. Review your physical security plan in conjunction with the development of your bomb incident plan.

 

Command Center

 

1. Designate a primary location and an alternate location. 
2. Assign personnel and designate decision making authority. 
3. Establish a method for tracking search teams. 
4. Maintain a list of likely target areas. 
5. Maintain a blueprint of floor diagrams in the center. 
6. Establish primary and secondary methods of communication. (Caution-the use of two-way radios during a search can cause premature detonation of an electric blasting cap.) 
7. Formulate a plan for establishing a command center, if a threat is received after normal work hours. 
8. Maintain a roster of all necessary telephone numbers. 

 

Bomb Search Illustrations (removed)
 
 

 

BOMB INCIDENT CHECKLIST

 

Exact time of call:

 

Exact words of caller:

 

QUESTIONS TO ASK

1. When is bomb going to explode?

2. Where is the bomb?

3. What does it look like?

4. What kind of bomb is it?

5. What will cause it to explode?

6. Did you place the bomb?

7. Why?

8. Where are you calling from?

9. What is your address?

10. What is your name?

 

CALLER'S VOICE (circle)